

Transforming state visions: Ideology and ideas in armed groups turned political parties – Introduction to special issue

Devon Curtis and Gyda M. Sindre*

Accepted for publication Government and Opposition, October 9 2018. DoI not yet assigned. (Please cite published version)

** Equal contribution by co-authors*

How do the visions of the state articulated by armed movements during conflict change when they become political parties after war? We show that ideas about the state are often central to the strategies and direction of these new parties, but there is enormous variation. The first part of the article shows why a focus on former rebel parties provides valuable insights into the role of ideas in post-war politics. The second part draws on the literatures on civil wars and political parties to highlight their relevance for former rebel parties. The third part provides a framework for understanding the variation in the role of ideology in former rebel parties, by focusing on ideological content and explanations of post-war ideological continuity and change. This part also introduces the other articles in the special issue and wider collection. Finally, we discuss the effects of these ideologies when they encounter other logics of post-war politics.

1. Introduction

This collection of articles consists of this special issue, as well as a number of linked articles in other issues of *Government and Opposition*.¹ Together, the collection explores the role of ideas in influencing and shaping contemporary processes of state-building after conflict. It does so by analysing the multiple ways in which ideas and ideology play essential roles in understanding the trajectories and governance programmes of political parties that have a history of armed mobilisation against the state. The collection therefore focuses on former armed movements that have transformed into political parties, that operate either as ruling parties or opposition parties. We argue that ideas and ideologies are often central to the strategies and internal life of these new parties, yet there is enormous variation among different groups. Sometimes ideologies are used instrumentally yet sometimes they reflect strong normative commitments that may act against strategic goals. At other times, the ideas and visions underpinning former armed movements are flexible and commitment is weak, yet sometimes ideas remain impervious to change, even when there has been a dramatic change of context from an armed movement to political party. This collection of articles examines this variation in the consistency of ideologies of former armed groups over time and suggests avenues through which this variation can be understood. Attention to the ideological underpinnings of

¹ The articles in this special issue consist of contributions from Benedetta Berti, Ntagahoraho Burihabwa and Devon E. A. Curtis, John Ishiyama, Carrie Manning and Ian Smith, Gyda M. Sindre, and Ralph Sprenkels. The collection of linked articles from the project also includes articles by Lovise Aalen, Burcu Özçelik, Justin Pearce, Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, and Alice Wilson. All of these articles were discussed at a workshop at the University of Cambridge in September 2017.

former armed groups turned political parties provides novel perspectives to contemporary state-building.

With some important exceptions (Blattman 2009; Sanín and Wood 2014), much of the scholarly work on post-Cold war armed movements downplays the role of ideas and ideology in favour of arguments that concentrate on structural factors or economic motivations. For many authors (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Duffield 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003), ideas are important insofar as they may play a useful role in recruitment and mobilization, but they tend not to be analysed as systems of belief setting out alternative visions of state governance. Thus, much of the early literature on post-Cold war armed movements characterises these movements as non-ideological. On the other hand, the literature on political parties does analyse the role of ideas and ideology and yet political parties that have emerged out of armed conflict are treated as 'outliers' and 'exceptional.' For example, Mair (1984) noted early on that comparative scholars excluded the Irish parties and party system from comparative research because of the distinctiveness of post-civil war partisan alignments. Similarly, contemporary research on post-communist parties and parties in 'new democracies' have often explicitly omitted post-civil war as being too different to be examined in light of existing party theory (e.g. Basedau and Stroh 2008; Grzymala-Busse 2002; Ishiyama 1999; Ishiyama 1997). Likewise, the ideological aspects of political parties in the global South are often discounted. While some earlier work did focus on the different facets of political parties in the global South including organisation and ideology (Coleman and Rosberg 1964), much of the scholarship today, particularly on sub-Saharan Africa, tries to explain the non-ideological nature of political parties (Carbone 2007; Carothers 2006) or reduces the discussion of ideology to a discussion of ideas and beliefs about ethnicity (Posner 2005).

On the contrary, we argue that it is important to bring ideology into the study of post-conflict comparative politics and that an analysis of former non-state armed movements is a useful lens through which to understand the potential lasting effect of ideas on post-conflict governance. We take ideology to mean a logically coherent belief system that provides a guide to action (Mullins 1972; Putnam 1971; Sartori 1969). It is the way in which a system, such as an individual, a group, or an entire society rationalises itself (Knight 2006: 619). Ideologies provide a framework for action in a range of different areas, for instance, in how war is conducted (Ron 2001; Graham 2007; Ugarriza and Craig 2013, Thaler 2012), or how resources are distributed in society. We are particularly interested in ideas about the state, and how the state is, or should be, organised. We focus specifically on post-war politics, and thus how ideologies lead to particular ideas about the nature of the state articulated by former rebel political parties.

There are three main reasons why a focus on political parties that were former non-state armed movements can provide valuable insights into the role of ideas in post-war politics. First, many non-state armed groups – or rebel movements – articulate radical ideas of state transformation. These ideas serve strategic goals such as recruitment and coordination, but they also socialise

combatants and supporters into a coherent group. Armed groups express more or less coherent narratives about *why* they are fighting, which typically involves claims against the state, often along with a vision of what kind of state might replace it, or what kind of state reforms are required. In secessionist movements, ideas of radical state transformation are often articulated as a desire for a new state with reformed citizenship and governance practices, sometimes, but not always, defined by the actors themselves in ethnic terms. In many other types of intra-state conflicts, non-state armed movements have sought to establish a radically reconfigured state based on revolutionary principles, liberation ideologies or radical religious interpretations of statehood, which may include demands for inclusion, reformed governance practices and reconstituted state-society relations. These expressions of political imaginaries sometimes serve as a guiding and unifying vision for the movement and also help mobilise supporters and recruits.

Second, after the formal end of hostilities, there is great variation in the extent to which these ideas about a reconstituted or reformed state continue to be articulated and implemented. After conflict has ended, what happens to the ideas and state visions espoused by armed groups? Specifically, the articles in this special issue and wider collection ask whether the ideas of state transformation by armed groups turned political parties were implemented after the end of conflict, or whether these ideas, ideologies and governance ambitions have shifted. Our analysis includes both ruling parties and opposition parties that were previously armed actors since both types of parties have a bearing on state practices and ideas.

Third, the post-war period is a critical juncture in the development of institutions that can provide the foundations for peace and participation. Key questions about the nature of the state and its identity, the deployment of violence, the legitimacy of the state and its institutions are often not entirely resolved, and the ideas and practices that dominate during this critical juncture will have a bearing on what is possible later. Political parties that are former armed movements are crucial actors in state-building processes. Understanding how these parties practice politics in 'peace-time', and the extent to which ideas about the state reflect normative commitments, have a bearing on the possibilities of state- and peace- building. Democratic processes often rest on the capacities of political parties to represent citizens and aggregate interests, provide organizational structures for political participation, as well as train political leaders and representatives, so the role of parties is fundamental in post-conflict societies (Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009; Reilly 2006). For societies emerging out of war, political parties also often play a decisive role in mediating group conflicts and demilitarizing politics. One can therefore expect that parties can play a decisive role in forwarding political programmes that encourage the transformation of wartime social structures and create more democratic notions of citizenship (De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006; Lyons 2005; Reilly 2006), but this is not always the case. Thus, the strength, coherence and commitment to the ideas sustaining former armed movements influence later discourses and practices of the state.

Studying the role of ideas and ideologies espoused by former armed movements turned political parties is timely. To date, there is fairly extensive literature that analyses the process of rebel-to-party transformation (De Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama 2016; Sindre and Söderström 2016). These contributions focus on the challenges of transforming from armed movements to political parties, the internal workings of party organisations (e.g. Allison 2010; Ishiyama and Batta 2011b; Sindre 2016b) and the factors that influence whether and how parties adapt to democracy (Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Ishiyama and Batta 2011b; Lyons 2016a; Manning 2008). Other work has focused on former armed groups and conflict management, confirming that rebel group inclusion is key to ensuring political stability following a peace settlement (Marshall and Ishiyama 2016). What is missing, however, is an understanding of what happens to former armed groups over time, either as ruling parties or as opposition parties. Empirically, we know that these parties tend to survive, and yet former rebel parties are often ignored in the political party literature. Given the relatively large number of transitions that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, there are now sufficient cases from which we can begin to draw conclusions about the ways in which ideas and ideologies underpinning former armed groups have changed over time.

This article proceeds as follows. As a starting point, we situate our study of the ideologies and ideas of former rebel parties in relation to existing literatures on civil wars and armed movements on the one hand, and political parties on the other. Approaching the broad sub-field of comparative politics that is party research, we seek inspiration from earlier work, which highlights the core functions of political parties, namely that of interest aggregation and of political organising, where ideas and ideologies are central. We propose a framework for understanding the variation in ideas about the state after conflict through discussing ideological content as well as ideological change and continuity, and we show how these themes are carried forward in the articles in this special issue and collection. Finally, we discuss the effects of ideology in post-war politics, and we propose future directions in this emerging research agenda.

2. Key questions and review of previous research

That ideology has played a central role in the rhetorical repertoire of rebel groups throughout their struggle is undisputed. Leftist revolutionaries in El Salvador, Colombia and Nepal were inspired by the writings of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara and Mao Zedong as legitimising the armed struggle. Anti-colonial liberation movements featured revolutionary, often leftist ideas, outlining a vision of the social order once liberation had been achieved. Contemporary armed groups such as the Islamic State is likewise founded upon ideals of establishing a particular kind of political order. Yet, until fairly recently, ideology has been treated with caution by scholars of rebel group behaviour. Most studies viewed ideology as limited to its instrumental use – as rhetorical devices selected by leaders to enhance their legitimacy or mobilize supporters and fighters (Sanin

and Wood 2014: 213; Mampilly 2011: 77-79).² Especially as the proclaimed values of a group's ideology often failed to harmonize with the actual behaviour of armed groups in their interaction with civilians, ideology has not served well as an explanation for variation in the nature of rebel group behaviour. Even so, just from its instrumental purpose it is clear that ideology is important for recruitment and mobilization within armed groups and their supporters.

Civil war studies have also shown that ideology streamlines rebel behaviour. Religion sometimes truncates other strategic goals (Sanin and Wood, 2014), as exemplified by Hamas' decision to boycott the 1996 elections so as to not be perceived to be compromising on its 'absolutist ideology' (Løvlie 2013: 578). Hegghammer (2013) demonstrates that specific interpretations of Islam have provided strategic guidance about how and where it is legitimate to fight while Jo (2015) posits that variation in how some armed groups seek to build legitimacy, both internally and externally can in part be explained in light of their religious-ideological positions. Similarly, typologies that distinguish between rebel group goals have been helpful in explaining the changing character of wars over time (e.g. Clapham 1998; 2007; Reno 2011). Also, a coherent ideology allows an organization to communicate effectively with its external environment, thus increasing its legitimacy and its competitive advantage with respect to other organizations, which makes them similar to other forms of political organizations such as political parties and social movement organisations.

The mainstream literature on political parties emphasises ideological polarization to explain party and voter behaviour, however contemporary literature on political parties in newly democratizing countries tends to argue that parties in these contexts lack clear ideological profiles. Compared to counterparts in established democracies, parties in transitional contexts are commonly poorly organised and weakly rooted in society. They pop up only around election time to attract voters, party branches outside the capital are generally poorly staffed, and internal recruitment is first and foremost driven by patronage (Randall and Svåsand 2002; Aspinall and Weiss 2014; Ufen 2008). Consequently, voters often make up their minds about which party to vote for based on other, non-programmatic, markers such as identity (ethnic, territorial) and patronage (family and kinship). As Elischer (2012: 643) notes, with few exceptions, political parties in Africa are 'primarily driven by identity politics rather than programmatic ideas.'

Thus, both the civil war literature, and the political party literature provide some insights into the different ways that ideology can play a role in political mobilization, political behaviour, and party and voting behaviour. What is missing is an understanding as to how ideology influences former rebel parties' governance strategies after war.

² Collier and Hoeffler (2004) posited that ethnic dominance was a better predictor of civil war than 'ideological factors,' with ideology primarily understood in terms of divisions such as class or social cohesion. Other highly influential econometric work has either argued that there is no need to explicitly include ideology (Fearon and Laitin 2003) or has neglected ideology altogether (Hegre and Sambanis 2006).

The most likely parable to the study of whether and how ideology impacts on former rebel parties' governance strategies after war is found in the rebel governance literature. While much recent scholarship held that ideology – most often understood as leftist or revolutionary ideologies - had little direct influence on the behaviour of insurgents in their interaction with civilians (e.g. Weinstein 2007), other contributions have argued that ideology becomes salient when analysing variation in the specific forms of governance provided by armed groups (Mampilly 2011: 78; Arjona et.al. 2015; Kasfir 2005). Indeed, multiple contemporary case studies of rebel governments argue that their ideological foundations help determine their governance practices and the types of institutions they set up. Wilson (2016: 183), for instance, argues that the Polisario front in Western Sahara implemented radical policies such as quotas for women and redistribution of food rations from their position in exile in the Polisario-controlled refugee camps. These governance experiments were derived from their programmatic precepts. Similarly, Sukeyens (2015) comparing two rebel groups in India demonstrates that the governance ideologies of the Naxalites, a Maoist rebel group and the Naga, a secessionist movement, strongly influenced their specific governance practices and the 'administrative functions of protection taxation and service delivery' (Sukeyens 2015: 139).

Beyond the battlefield, rebel groups have also sought opportunities to govern via the electoral channel. In Northern Ireland (prior to the Good Friday Agreement), Lebanon and Palestine the main armed groups developed political wings to be able to take part in national and regional-level elections (see Berti 2013), without a peace settlement and without demobilizing their armed wings. As a consequence, 'some armed groups have gained enormous political and decision-making power' by actively seeking power via democratic mechanisms (Berti 2013, 1).

The literatures on rebel governance and on armed groups' electoral participation draw attention to a potentially rich vein of enquiry, focusing on which factors shape political practices and the conditions under which non-state armed groups decide to adapt and change their organization and mode of political engagement. While ideological moderation and de-radicalization of radical leftist parties and religious parties (e.g. Schwedler 2007; Tezcür 2010) has received significant scholarly attention by party scholars, this scholarship has not yet paid significant attention to armed political groups and former rebel groups. The study of ideological change and moderation within radical political parties have tended to focus on explaining whether and how their electoral participation has led them to moderate and rid themselves of illiberal political positions in order to become mainstream parties (e.g. Kalyvas 1996; Bermeo 1997, Brocker and Künkler 2013). While such processes of adaptation have underpinned debates about rebel-to-party transformation (e.g. Manning 2008; Berti 2013; Whiting 2018; Sindre 2018), this sub-set of political parties raises new questions regarding how and why parties adapt and to what effect.

In recent years, some scholars interested in rebel-to-party transformation and political parties in post-war states have highlighted how wartime ideologies continue to shape how these parties govern. For instance, Salih (2003: 18) notes

that former African liberation movements turned political parties remain heavily influenced by their conflict experience and the 'ethos of the liberation ideology'. Chemouni and Mugiraneza (2018) explore the ideological project of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) before and at the time of the genocide through songs and argue that there are continuities between the RPF's pre and post-genocide ideological discourse. Discussing former armed movements in Southeast Asia and in Namibia respectively, Sindre (2016a) and Metsola and Melber (2007) show that the histories of the armed struggle and the associated sacrifices remain central to political discourses, and are also reflected in specific policies they propose as they become ruling parties. Such case studies raise new questions about whether and how radical ideas, ideologies and visions for a new political order propagated by these groups during war is carried on into peace-time politics.

Building on these insights, this special issue and wider collection of articles bring forward the debate by emphasising that it is not only the organizational legacy of former armed movements and which parties are included/excluded from power that are important, but also the types of political actors and their ideas – and thereby political issues – that remain salient after war has ended. A key question is to understand whether and how change, moderation and adaption are central to how these groups navigate the changing post-war political field. Hence, it is necessary to move beyond viewing ideology as primarily a unifying mobilizational tool within movements and between movements and those they claim to represent in order to rationalize their existence (Knight 2006). As Berti (this issue) notes, ideology also serves to presents the image of what constitutes a 'good society' and of the chief means of constructing it.

The articles in this collection do two things. First, by moving beyond viewing rebel group inclusion as a purely instrumental part of implementing lasting peace settlements and thus primarily a mechanism for buying off or appeasing the leaders of armed movements, the authors highlight the great variation in the motivations and abilities of formerly armed actors turned political parties in influencing and directly shaping the post-conflict state. As such, in assessing whether and how wartime ideologies and ideas continue to influence their post-war governing strategies, the collection offers new insights into the transformative effects of war on peace, through the lens of former wartime contenders. Second, these papers propose a critically attuned engagement with the transformative agendas of former armed groups and of political parties in post-war contexts in their interaction with other actors and logics.

3. The role of ideology and ideas of armed groups turned political parties: Content, continuity and change

The previous section has shown that while some existing literature on rebel movements has paid attention to ideology and ideas of the state, the extension or modification of these ideas in peace time has been largely overlooked. Likewise, the literature on political parties has examined the role of ideology, but the specific ideas of former rebel parties has not been sufficiently explored. The articles in this special issue and in the larger collection focus specifically on former rebel parties and seek to understand the extent to which their war-time ideas of the state persist, moderate, or are abandoned.

The contributions that follow show that there is immense variation in terms of ideological commitments and pronouncements among rebel movements, and what happens to former rebels' ideas of the state after conflict. We emphasise several key aspects. First, there is variation in ideological content. Different armed groups have different ideas about the state. Some groups seek radical transformation of the state, others seek their own state, others seek inclusion or reform. Second, there is variation in terms of ideological continuity. Do the ideas and ideologies fuelling the movement show consistency and stability after conflict? Do radical ideas about state transformation that originally underpinned the armed movement have lasting currency, or do parties adapt or moderate their claims and why? How and why do ideas change? Through single and comparative cases, the articles in this collection illustrate and explain the different factors that lead to continuity or adaptation.

3.1. Ideological Content:

Ideology means many different things to different scholars (Maynard 2013: 300). As Maynard points out in his map of the field, contemporary research on ideology is vast, drawing upon different approaches that sometimes reflect real substantive disagreement (Maynard 2013). According to one approach, ideologies provide the frameworks for people to understand their political worlds and are built from concepts whose content is indeterminate and contested (Freedman 1996 in Maynard 2013: 302). Thus, ideologies are belief systems through which individuals, groups and entire societies rationalise themselves (Knight 2006: 619).

We focus on the group level, since we are interested in former rebel parties. For the study of armed movements turned political parties, we follow Sanin and Wood's understanding of ideology as a "set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency, the challenges the group confronts, the objectives to pursue on behalf of that group, and a (perhaps vague) program of action." (Sanin and Wood 2014: 214) Thus, an armed group's ideology encompasses both a set of beliefs about the world and how the world should be, as well as strategies or ideas about how to create such a world. Ideologies are not easily delineated. They involve beliefs about a range of different fields such as appropriate individual behaviour, the appropriate expression of gender identities, the identity and role of the state, the role of society, the nature of justice, the appropriate distribution of resources, the role of international relations, and so on. The articles in this collection focus on ideas about the state, broadly conceived. Other beliefs are discussed insofar as they affect the state. We

therefore treat ideas about the nation, ethnicity, religion, economic organisation as central ideologies about state identity and practices (see also Sanin and Wood 2014), thus departing from authors that consider ideology on a spectrum running from socialism to capitalism (Young 1982).

Methodologically, it is difficult to observe ideology. Usually, scholars will analyse the political vocabulary of a movement as a sign of its identity and beliefs. This includes the study of political manifestos, programmes, and/or declarations and political speeches (Berti, Burihabwa and Curtis, Sindre, all in this issue; Aalen, forthcoming; Pearce forthcoming; Reyntjens 2016; Straus 2015), the analysis of party name changes (Ishiyama, this issue) or interviews with group leaders and/or members (Özçelik, forthcoming; Pearce, forthcoming). Scholars also study the discourses through which ideology is both constituted and spread. They may analyse media such as radio, or songs, poetry and music (e.g. Chemouni and Mugiraneza 2018; Lecocq 2004). Sometimes, scholars focus on political behaviour and practices, and identify the ideological commitments that encourage this behaviour (Sprenkels, this issue; Wilson, forthcoming).

There are several shortcomings in studying ideological content through the political vocabulary and ideas expressed in manifestos, programmes, speeches, interviews, and other forms of media. These difficulties apply to both armed movements' ideological programmes, and political party programmes. It is difficult to determine if language reflects 'true' ideological commitment. Party manifestos, for instance, may be written for different target audiences for different reasons, not only as an appeal for votes (Harmel 2018: 230). In the case of armed rebel movements, there are extensive debates about whether rebels are truly committed to the ideas and ideologies that they express, or whether these ideas are used for instrumental and strategic reasons in order to attract recruits, maintain solidarity and cohesion, and prevent defection. Furthermore, in many contexts rebel movements and political parties may come under pressure from external supporters, donors, or other actors to present particular narratives, regardless of actual commitment. For some authors, ideologies can be understood as systems of power, to be adopted or discarded depending on when they serve the interest of power (e.g. Althusser 1976). We acknowledge that ideologies include both strategic and normative components, which are sometimes methodologically difficult to distinguish. Nonetheless, we believe that what armed movements and political parties say that they are doing is important, regardless of whether or not they reflect true 'beliefs'. The true intentions or motivations for adopting or sustaining an ideology are less important than the extent to which these ideas fuel the internal life of the movement, and the degree of coherence around a particular set of ideas.

To assess ideological change or continuity, we need to understand both the war-time ideological content and aspirations articulated by armed movements, as well as their post-war ideas of the state. Three dimensions of ideological content come across as particularly important.

First, ideologies produce particular ideas about the boundaries of political community. There are debates about whether nationalism itself is an ideology

(e.g. Adams 1993; Heywood 1992; Freedman 1996), but questions of what constitutes the nation and how this is expressed politically are often central to armed conflict. Some armed movements challenging the state do not agree with established boundaries and seek new political communities. As Sindre shows in this issue, the call for self-determination through secession is a prominent feature of some ethno-nationalist armed movements such as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia Herzegovina, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland. While Sinn Fein still seeks reunification with Ireland, the parties in Aceh, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sri Lanka have abandoned their claims to separate statehood and instead adopted regionalist positions. Political parties in hybrid no-war-no-peace contexts also make choices about the boundaries and limits of their political community. For instance, Özçelik (forthcoming) shows that the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern Syria abandoned its pursuit of ethnic secession, and instead articulated demands for a civic non-ethnic autonomous region, despite its Kurdish co-ethnics in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. In other cases, the boundaries of political community are defined in religious as well as nationalist terms. Berti shows that Hamas built its political claims on the basis of its Sunni Islamist identity and connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as its nationalist struggle (Berti, this issue). She also shows that Hezbollah's initial ideological positions rested upon the desire to establish an Islamic State in Lebanon, but this goal was subsequently dropped as Hezbollah started to identify itself as being part of the Lebanese political system. Thus, ideas about the nation, religion and ethnicity and the boundaries of political community are often centrally important to rebel movement ideologies. These ideas may translate into political commitments in favour of secession, or significant autonomy and decentralisation, or new forms of political relationships.

Second, ideologies inform ideas about who should govern. It is not only the boundaries of political community that are at stake in conflict, but broader questions about who should be included in governance structures and how they should govern. In many conflicts, armed groups mobilise on behalf of groups that perceive themselves to have been excluded or discriminated against by the existing state (Nafziger, Stewart and Vayrynen 2000; Hutchful and Aning 2004; McClintock 1984). From the ANC struggle in South Africa to the Zapatistas in Mexico, many armed movements advocate radical reform of the state to allow for full participation in governance structures. In this collection of articles, demands for inclusion and new forms of governance lie at the heart of many of the movements discussed by authors, even in non-secessionist conflicts. For instance, Burihabwa and Curtis show that the CNDD-FDD rebel movement in Burundi has its origins in the systematic exclusion of the Hutu in post-independence political, economic and military structures. (Burihabwa and Curtis, this issue). In the Western Saharan conflict, Wilson shows how Polisario expressed ideas of governance rooted in direct, participatory democracy, whereby refugees would take part in grassroots participatory forums and where 'committees of the people' (mainly staffed by women during the conflict) would run public services (Wilson, forthcoming). In Angola, as in many other anti-colonial struggles, Pearce explains how UNITA emerged as an anti-colonial

movement, fighting for independence, democracy and equality (Pearce, forthcoming).

Third, ideologies influence views about how the state should distribute economic resources and deliver public services. This is perhaps the dimension of ideological content that most closely reflects accounts that emphasise ideological classifications ranging from socialism to capitalism. Many armed movements, particularly those with their origins before the end of the Cold War, expressed a commitment to Marxist-Leninism. The ubiquity of Marxist-Leninist ideas has led some authors to discount these ideological pronouncements and see them as a reflection of opportunism and international alliances. Burihabwa and Curtis show, for instance, that the Marxist-Leninist ideas that once animated the CNDD-FDD in Burundi were largely abandoned (this issue). In other cases former rebel parties have sought to maintain revolutionary ideas, for instance the EPRDF's ideology of revolutionary democracy in Ethiopia explained by Aalen (forthcoming), and the FMLN's continued commitment to a socialist revolution in El Salvador as part of an 'ideological composite' described by Sprenkels in this issue. Even in cases where former rebel parties do not have Marxist-Leninist roots, ideas about economic redistribution remain central. For instance, Pearce shows that UNITA in Angola retains an emphasis on economic redistribution, expressed as putting the countryside first (Pearce, forthcoming).

Most armed movements address these three ideological dimensions to some degree. Yet the extent of agreement over ideas about the state within an armed movement is highly variable, which has implications for later continuity and change. Some groups are relatively cohesive, with coherent and far-reaching ideological expression. Examples of relatively cohesive groups include the RPF in Rwanda, as well as the Polisario in Western Sahara. In other cases, different factions of the armed group may express different ideological preferences, and part of the struggle is fought between different movement factions. Internal divisions within the group have an impact on ideological content, as described by Berti, Burihabwa and Curtis, and Sprenkels (all this issue) and Aalen (forthcoming). Relatedly, some ideas are malleable and others are more fixed. The articulation of a group's ideology may be purposefully ambiguous in order to appeal to different audiences and faction. Sometimes the vision of the state comes across as a coherent manifesto, sometimes as a loose and shifting set of ideas, and sometimes as a continually contested terrain. What is clear, however, is that in different cases, ideologies work in different ways. They may be explicit or implicit and they may be ambiguous or rigidly defined and adhered to. Nonetheless, all of the contributions in this collection show that ideologies inform ideas about political community, participation in governance and economic distribution.

3.2. Continuity and Change: Unpacking moderation

To what extent do the ideas and ideologies fuelling the movement show consistency and stability after conflict, how do they change and why? The subject of ideological change has conventionally focused on radical parties' moderation

process following inclusion into formal electoral politics based on selected case universe of radical religious parties (e.g. Kalyvas 1996; Wickham 2004; Tezcür 2010; Schwedler 2006; Brouck and Künkler 2013) and/or communist parties.

With its focus on rebel groups turned political parties, this collection expands the scope conditions for understanding the role of ideology in post-war practices of politics. This entails not limiting the perspective to analysing ‘moderation’ – understood as the decrease in importance or complete abandonment of radical political goals and governance practices – but rather focusing on both ideological continuities and change.

Ideology and governance practices after war

The respective contributions of Wilson (Western Sahara) Aalen (Ethiopia), Pearce (Angola) and Burihabwa & Curtis (Burundi) all take up the question of whether wartime visions and ideas are put into practice once former rebel groups turned parties get the chance to govern.

While the emergence of authoritarian governance practices by rebel victors has been analysed at length (Lyons 2016a;b; Aalen and Muriaas 2015), Aalen (forthcoming) points out that little attention has been paid to understanding changes in the overarching ideological underpinnings of such regimes. In her analysis of Ethiopia’s ruling party, the EPRDF, Aalen argues that the ideological framework of ‘revolutionary democracy’ is used to legitimize a range of practices. However, contradictory ideas about the relationship between the centre and the subnational level of politics, primarily ethnic federalism and the developmental state, have led to continued tensions within the regime. Recent protests in Amhara and Oromo regions illustrate the inherent ideological contradiction within the regime, exhibiting the limits of revolutionary democracy as a legitimising ideology over time.

Burihabwa and Curtis point to similar internal contradictions within the CNDD-FDD in Burundi during its first decade as a ruling party to explain why the party reverted to authoritarian and divisive governance tactics. The authors contest the often held assumption that African rebel groups are void of ideological commitments, showing that the CNDD-FDD’s ideology was strongly anchored in resistance to the regime, the restoration of democracy and social justice. Yet internal factionalism between different ideational commitments led to tensions, and breakaway groups. The authors argue that those within the CNDD-FDD who had been best placed to put forward an inclusive state-building agenda were side-lined long before the war had ended, and those that remained have used governance strategies more akin to *previous* pre-war Burundian regimes rather than the wartime CNDD-FDD ideological programme.

Wilson identifies a contrasting pattern in her case study of the Polisario Front in Western Sahara in which she highlights continuities between wartime ideological goals and governance practices by the Polisario ruling authority. Her study reveals a distinct pattern of experimentation with radical policies informed by wartime revolutionary ideas that underpinned the movement. An intriguing case of insurgents turned rulers but without military victory and

controlling territory outside the designated 'homeland', Polisario reveals a dual process of continued experimentation of radical politics and moderation. Some radical policies have enabled and supported subsequent moderation when moderation is understood as adaptation to institutions of liberal democracy. 'Radicalism and moderation' Wilson argues, can be overlapping even if partially contradictory processes.

Tracing present-day governance practices by the UNITA party in rural Angola, the successor party of the rebel group that suffered military defeat after a decade-long civil war, Pearce shows that there are strong continuities between wartime practices and post-war politics of UNITA, now an opposition party. Pearce's findings show surprising continuities that fall outside patrimonial logics of party politics. For instance, party branches are staffed by volunteers and unsalaried cadres who dedicate free time to the movement. As such, the UNITA case provides much needed critique of common assumptions that African political parties are first and foremost identity based groups driven by patronage machineries.

The four cases of the EPRDF, CNDD-FDD, UNITA and the Polisario Front represent four different paths of conflict outcomes: Rebel victory in Ethiopia, negotiated settlement in Burundi, rebel military defeat in Angola and the peculiar context of governing in exile for the Polisario Front in the refugee camps in Algeria. In all cases the authors point to the challenges of redefining ideological foundations in peace-time but show how post-war governance practices and legitimacy strategies remain informed by foundational ideologies.

Adapting ideologies and programmes

A second set of articles in this collection asks whether and how electoral participation impacts on identity and ideological change. Is rebranding important to remain electorally viable? Which aspects of a party's identity are changed and which ones remain the same?

Electoral logics play an important role in the adaptation of former rebel parties' ideology. Elections present a significant change in the political environment for former rebels. As several authors have shown, the shift from contestation in the battlefield to contestation at the ballot box is not always an easy transition (Manning 2008; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015; Sindre 2016b; Allison 2010). Manning and Smith (this issue) show that of 89.6 per cent of parties formed out of rebel groups have contested at least one election. Using a large N data-set of post rebel parties and elections between 1990 and 2016, they study the effects of a range of environmental characteristics (e.g. presence of older parties, electoral rules) and organisational endowments such as ideational capital and organizational competencies on electoral performance. They find that the presence of ideologically similar parties has a positive impact on electoral performance suggesting that well-defined ideological cleavage structures during the war remain politically salient after conflict. Therefore, to understand electoral performance one must understand how ideology interacts with other factors.

Ishiyama (this issue) assesses the question of whether changes in identity, both in terms of image and ideology, positively impacts the electoral success of former rebel parties once they engage in political competition. Using an original dataset, he asks whether former rebel parties that undergo significant 'rebranding' by repackaging their images are more politically successful than parties that have not done so. The article finds that those parties that have repackaged their identities by downplaying their wartime ideological commitments (i.e. by changing their names) fare no better politically than parties that have not repackaged their identities. However, he finds that former rebel parties that have distanced themselves from the war by officially renouncing violence have more positive electoral outcomes.

These findings suggest that renouncing violence and committing to peace is important for explaining post-war electoral success. It also suggests that factors other than electoral success help explain why and how some parties undergo significant rebranding while others do not. The case studies by Sprenkels, Sindre, Berti (all this issue) and Söderberg Kovacs (forthcoming) shed further light on the mechanisms that underpin ideological adaptation following entrance into electoral politics.

Sprenkels' contribution analyses the ideological evolution of the FMLN in El Salvador, a former rebel party that successfully transitioned from opposition party to ruling party after participating in multiple election cycles. While the FMLN has strategically adapted some of their political programmes to broaden their electoral appeal and have become more mainstream, it has also retained many aspects of their revolutionary discourse. Sprenkels finds that the concept of *ambivalent moderation* provides a lens through which to understand how wartime revolutionary ideas have been moulded as the party has become electorally viable. Ideology, he notes, is subject to constant internal debate revealing an inherent friction between party cadres and leadership – categories that are deeply anchored in the wartime organizational structure of the FMLN.

In another sub-set of former rebel parties, ethno-nationalist parties, Sindre further unpacks the concept of moderation by identifying which aspects of the ideology of former rebel parties contribute to peacebuilding. Continued adherence to narrowly defined goals of ethno-nationalism, she argues, will counter long-term efforts for reconciliation. Ethno-nationalist parties such as the TNA, the SDS and the Aceh Party that form the basis for her comparative study, originally waged war to establish new states based on ethnically defined citizenships. Moderation in these contexts, Sindre notes, should not be limited to analysing whether or not the parties adapt to electoral politics, but also take into account the extent to which they adopt more inclusive programmatic profiles and policies. Sindre shows that having been wartime contenders, these parties have also invested significant resources in peace negotiations and/or peace agreements. Yet, there is variation in the extent to which the parties remain anchored in wartime cleavages that uphold ethnic divisions, which can in part be explained by the nature of the party system and the levels of inter-party competition.

Also focusing on identity-based movements, Berti's contribution outlines a different logic of ideological adaptation tracing the discourse and shifts in the programmes and profiles of Hamas and Hezbollah over time. Ideological continuity and coherence in terms of issue profiles and discourse is important to retain legitimacy both internally and amongst voters. At the same time, both parties have had to respond to changes in the context within which they mobilize and garner electoral support. For instance, while Hamas continues to frame its role as a public service provider in relation to building an Islamic state, by 2017 its official stance on Sharia law has been downplayed and its general stance on the role of an Islamic state is more ambiguous. As Berti notes, the parties have had to 'rethink and sharpen their state-building visions and aspirations.'

In contrast to the above cases, Söderberg Kovacs focuses on a negative case, the RUF in Sierra Leone, a party that has been unable to make itself relevant to the post-war electorate. The inability to renew its ideological outlook and adapt its image and programme to post-war realities are key to explaining its failure at the ballot, she argues, while the composition of the party membership helps explain the continued commitment to a wartime revolutionary ideology. Much of the more clientelistically oriented membership deserted the party after the war, and most remaining members were ideological hardliners, motivated by the party's wartime ideology and unwilling to instigate change or party-rebranding.

What we can draw from this discussion is that while former rebel parties undergo some sort of image repackaging and rebranding to adapt to the new context of post-war politics, this does not necessarily entail a de-radicalization or moderation. Former rebel parties tend to invest resources into reinterpreting and reframing wartime ideologies without rejecting them, in such a way that allows for maximization of political expedience ahead of elections.

4. Conclusions: Ideological effects and implications for governance

If ideologies are malleable, at least to some extent, and if former rebel parties repackage and rebrand their ideas to suit their new post war contexts, then are ideologies simply subsumed under other logics of politics? The articles in this collection suggest a co-constitutive relationship, where ideologies interact with other logics. Thus, ideologies play a role in shaping electoral, patrimonial and state-building logics but they are also shaped by them. The connection between former rebel parties' ideological claims and commitments and these other logics of politics help us understand governance practices in post-war contexts.

As the papers in this collection have shown, former rebel parties demonstrate a range of different governance practices. Often these practices resonate with the claims made by rebels about the state during the war while sometimes they do not. Practices vary on a number of different axes. Governance practices may be more hierarchical or consensual, authoritarian or democratic, exclusive or inclusive, centralised or decentralised, personalised or bureaucratised. The role of coercion is particularly prominent in some cases, and less so in others.

It is beyond the scope of this article to unpack these governance practices and further research is necessary to untangle the relationships between ideologies and their effects on governance. Nonetheless, the papers in this collection suggest that in addition to electoral logics, at least two other political logics may influence, and be influenced by, former rebel parties' ideologies. First, patrimonial logics continue to play an important role in many post-war environments. Kinship, patronage and reciprocity often help shape the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. In these cases, loyalties remain highly personalised. Typically, if patrimonial forms of governance characterise pre-war political structures, they also structure the internal governance of rebel insurgents, as well as the nature of post-war governance (de Waal 2009, Reno 2011, Burihabwa and Curtis this issue). Former rebel party governance may display different forms of patrimonialism, for instance, developmental patrimonialism by the RPF in Rwanda (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012), a revitalisation of clientelism by the FMLN in El Salvador (Sprenkels, this issue), and the manifestation of cartel state structures in Timor Leste. Ideologies thus connect to practices and structures shaped by the pre-war context and by the armed struggle in contentious and ambiguous ways. Future research is needed to help better understand the mechanisms through which these interactions occur.

Second, ideological commitment and pressures for change interact with other state-building logics to produce specific governance practices. As described above and shown in the collection of articles, former rebel parties often express visions of state reform. Yet these visions do not necessarily translate into concrete state transformation programmes even when former rebels become ruling parties. In part, this is because former rebel parties encounter other types of state-building logics. For instance, in many post-conflict contexts international actors play prominent roles in promoting projects and initiatives that reflect their own views about the requirements of state-building. From the late 1990s the prevailing international orthodoxy was that peace-building and state-building went together (Curtis 2013; Chandler 2017), and thus significant donor funds went towards realising a particular vision of state-building which did not necessarily correspond to the vision articulated by former rebels. More recently, international state-building programmes are increasingly being questioned and reconsidered, in part due to their failure in Iraq, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere. These failures can be at least partly attributed to the fact that the state-building programmes promoted by international actors did not take into account existing political structures and political aspirations of former rebel parties and other groups. As the papers in this collection suggest, understanding these connections is an important emerging area of academic inquiry.

Many different factors influence the ways in which former rebels govern in peace-time. Pre-war political and economic structures, the way in which conflict ended, the continuation of war-time cleavages in society, the party system, internal party organisational dynamics, the domestic political landscape, and international support are all important in different contexts, and may open and close off different governance alternatives. This collection of articles points to former rebel parties' ideologies as an important component, and the articles help

us understand the different ways that ideology works in different contexts. We show that there is great diversity in terms of the ideological content expressed by rebels when they are fighting, and the types of claims that they make vis-à-vis the state. In peace-time, these ideological commitments interact with other political logics, including electoral, patrimonial and state-building logics to produce new forms and strategies of governance, and new ideological trajectories. The resulting ideas and practices may show signs of continuity with prior claims about the state or may rest upon new state visions.

Commentators sometimes lament the fact that groups that may have criticised structures of exclusion, injustice, and exploitation in war-time do not maintain ideals and practices of inclusion, justice and fairness when they govern. While it is true that the practices of governance often fail to live up to their promises, this does not necessarily mean that such visions are completely abandoned. The papers in this collection take a more nuanced view and argue that it is necessary to understand former rebels' agendas and visions on their own terms, and the political environment that former rebel parties are embedded within, in order to assess what happens to these ideas over time. Only then can we understand why certain pathways are chosen over others, and what implications this may have on peace, social justice, and democracy.

References

- Adams I** (1993) *Political Ideology Today*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Allison ME** (2010) The Legacy of Violence on Post-civil War Elections: The Case of El Salvador. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45(1):104-124.
- Althusser L** (1976) L'Idéologie et les appareils idéologiques d'Etat. In Althusser L *Positions* (Paris: Editions sociales).
- Arjona A** (2016) *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Aspinall E and Weiss ML** (2014) The Limits of Civil Society: Social Movements and Political Parties in Southeast Asia. In R. Robison (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics*. London and New York: Routledge: 213-228.
- Basedau, M, Erdmann G and Mehler A** (2007), 'Votes, Money and Violence. Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa', (Uppsala/Scottsville: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet and University of Kwazulu-Natal Press).
- Basedau M and Stroh A** (2008) Measuring Party Institutionalization in Developing Countries. *GIGA Working Papers* 69.
- Bermeo N** (1997) Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions. *Comparative Politics* 29(3), 305-322.
- Berti B** (2013) *Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Berti B and Gutiérrez B** (2016) Rebel-to-political and Back? Hamas as a Security Provider in Gaza between Rebellion, Politics and Governance. *Democratization* 23(6), 1059-1076.
- Blattman C** (2009) From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda. *American Political Science Review* 103(2), 215-237.
- Bogaards M, Basedau M and Hartmann C** (2010) Ethnic Party Bans in Africa: An Introduction. *Democratization* 17(4), 599-617.
- Booth D and Golooba-Mutebi F** (2012) Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda. *African Affairs* 111(444), 379-403.
- Brocker M and M Künkler (2013)** Religious parties: Revisiting the inclusion-moderation hypothesis - Introduction *Party Politics* 19(2):171-186.
- Carbone GM** (2007) Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa: Themes and Research Perspectives. *World Political Science Review* 3(3), 1-29.
- Carothers T** (2006) *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Chemouni B and Mugiraneza A**. Singing the Struggle: The Rwandan Patriotic Front's Ideology Through its Songs of Liberation. *Aegis Trust Working Paper*, forthcoming 2018.
- Chandler D** (2017) *Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1997-2017*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Clapham C** (1998) *African Guerrillas*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Clapham, C** (2007) African guerrillas revisited in M Bøås and K. Dunn (Eds.) *African guerrillas: raging against the machine*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- Coleman JS and Rosberg CG** (1964) *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*: University of California Press.
- Collier P and Hoeffler A** (2004) Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, 563-595.
- Cramer C** (2002) Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism and the Political Economy of War. *World Development* 30(11), 1845-64.
- Curtis D** (2013) The Limits to Statebuilding for Peace in Africa. *South African Journal of International Affairs* 20(1), 79-97.
- Curtis D and de Zeeuw J** (2009) Rebel Movements and Political Party Development in Post-Conflict Societies - A Short Literature Review. *Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, Program on States and Security*. New York: The Graduate Center, City University of New York.
- De Waal A** Mission Without End? Peacekeeping in the African Political Marketplace. *International Affairs* 85(1), 99-113.
- De Zeeuw J** (2008) *From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War*. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- De Zeeuw J and Kumar K** (2006) Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- Duffield M** (2001) *Global Governance and the New War: the Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books.
- Elischer S** (2012) Measuring and Comparing Party Ideology in Nonindustrialized Societies: Taking Party Manifesto Research to Africa." *Democratization* 19(4), 642-667.

- Fearon JD and Laitin DD** (2003) Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97(1), 75-86.
- Freeden M** (1996) *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gomez-Reino M., De Winter L and Lynch P** (2006) Conclusion: The Future Study of Autonomist and Regionalist Parties. In L. De Winter L, Gomez-Reino, M, and Lynch, P (eds.), *Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and the Revival of the Territorial Cleavage*. Barcelona: ICPS, 247-270.
- Graham G** (2007) People's War? Self-Interest, Coercion and Ideology in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18(2), 231-248.
- Grzymala-Busse A** (2002) *Redeeming the Communist Past*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harmel R** (2018) The How's and Why's of Party Manifestos: Some Guidance for a Cross-National Research Agenda. *Party Politics* 24(3), 229-239.
- Hegghammer T** (2013) Should I stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' choices between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. *American Political Science Review* 107(1), 1-15.
- Hegre, H and Sambanis N** (2006) Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(4):508-535.
- Heywood A** (1992) *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Huntington S** (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Hutchful E and Aning K** (2004) The Political Economy of Conflict. In Adebajo A and Rashid I (eds.), *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace In a Troubled Region* Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner: 195-222.
- Ishiyama J** (1997) The Sickle or the Rose: Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the Ex-communist Parties. *Comparative Political Studies* 30(3), 258-274.
- Ishiyama J** (1999) The Communist Successor Parties and Party Organizational Development in Post-communist Politics. *Political Research Quarterly* 52(1), 87-112.
- Ishiyama J** (2014) Civil Wars and Party Systems. *Social Science Quarterly* 95(2), 425-447.
- Ishiyama J** (2016) From Bullets to Ballots: The Transformation of Rebel Groups into Political Parties. *Democratization* 23 (6), 969-971.
- Ishiyama J and Batta A** (2011a) Rebel Organizations and Conflict Management in Post-Conflict Societies 1990-2009. *Civil Wars* 13 (4), 437-457.
- Ishiyama J and Batta A** (2011b) Swords into Plowshares: The Organizational Transformation of Rebel Groups into Political Parties. *Communist and Post-communist Studies* 44(4), 369-379.
- Ishiyama J and Marshall M** (2017) What Explains Former Rebel Party Name Changes after a Civil Conflict Ends? External and Internal Factors and the Transition to Political Competition. *Party Politics* 23(4), 364-75.
- Jo H** (2015) *Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kalyvas SN** (1996) *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- Kasfir N** (2005) Guerillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981-86. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43(2), 271-296.
- Knight K** (2006) Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century. *The American Political Science Review* 100 (4): 619-626.
- LaPalombara J and Weiner M** (1966) Introduction: The Origin and Development of Political Parties, in LaPalombara J and Weiner M (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 3-43.
- Lecocq B** (2004) Unemployed Intellectuals in the Sahara: The Teshumara Nationalist Movement and the Revolutions in Tuareg Society. *International Review of Social History* 49(S12), 87-109.
- Lyons T** (2005) *Demilitarizing Politics. Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Lyons T** (2015) From Victorious Rebels to Strong Authoritarian Parties: Prospects for Post-war Democratization. *Democratization* 23(6), 1026-1041.
- Lyons T** (2016a) The Importance of Winning: Victorious Insurgent Groups and Authoritarian Politics. *Comparative Politics* 48 (2), 167-184.
- Lyons T** (2016b) Victorious Rebels and Postwar Politics. *Civil Wars* 18(2), 160-174.
- Løvlie F** (2013) Explaining Hamas's changing electoral strategy: 1996-2006. *Government and Opposition* 48(4), 570-593.
- Mair P** (1984) Recent Writings on Irish Politics. *West European Politics* 7(1): 128-134.
- Mampilly ZC** (2011) *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Manning C** (2008) *The Making of Democrats: Elections and Party Development in Postwar Bosnia, El Salvador and Mozambique*. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Marshall MC and Ishiyama J** (2016) Does Political Inclusion of Rebel Parties Promote Peace after Civil Conflict? *Democratization* 23 (6), 1009-1025.
- Massetti E and Schakel A** (2016) Between Autonomy and Secession: Decentralization and Regionalist Party Ideological Radicalism. *Party Politics* 22(1), 59-79.
- Maynard JL** (2013) A Map of the Field of Ideological Analysis. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18(3), 299-327.
- McClintock C** (1984) Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso. *World Politics* 37(1), 48-84.
- Metsola L and Henning M** (2007) Namibia's Pariah Heroes: Swapo Ex-Combatants between Liberation Gospel and Security Interests. In Buur, L., Jensen S and Stepputat F (eds.), *The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitization in Southern Africa*, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute: 85-106.
- Mullins WA** (1972) On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science. *American Political Science Review* 66(2), 478-510.
- Nafziger EW, Stewart F and Väyrynen R** (eds) (2000) *War, Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Newman S** (1997) Ideological Trends Among Ethnoregionalist Parties in Post-Industrial Democracies. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 3(1), 28-60.
- Posner D** (2005) *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam R** (1971) Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology. *American Political Science Review* 65(3):651-681.
- Randall V and Svåsand L** (2002) Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation. *Democratization* 9(3), 1 - 10.
- Randall V and Svåsand L** (2002) Party Institutionalization in New Democracies. *Party Politics* 8(1), 5-29.
- Reilly B** (2006) Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies. *Democratization* 13 (5), 811-827.
- Reilly B and Nordlund P** (2008) *Political Parties in Conflict-prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Reno W** (2011) *Warfare in Independent Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reyntjens F** (2016) (Re-)imagining a Reluctant Post-Genocide Society: The Rwandan Patriotic Front's Ideology and Practice. *Journal of Genocide Research* 18(1), 61-81.
- Ron J** (2001) Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso's Tactical Escalation. *Journal of Peace Research* 38(5), 569-592.
- Salih MA** (2003) *African Political Parties: Institutionalisation and Governance*." London: Pluto Press.
- Sanín FG and Wood EJ** (2014) Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond. *Journal of Peace Research* 51(2), 213-226.
- Sartori G** (1969) Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems. *The American Political Science Review* 63(2), 398-411.
- Schwedler J** (2007) Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties. *Development* 50(1), 56-61.
- Sindre GM** (2016a) In Whose Interests? Former Rebel Parties and Ex-combatant Interest Group Mobilisation in Aceh and East Timor. *Civil Wars* 18(2), 192-213.
- Sindre GM** (2016b) Internal Party Democracy in Former Rebel Parties. *Party Politics* 22(4), 501-511.
- Sindre GM** (2018) From Secessionism to Regionalism: Intra-organizational Conflict and Ideological Moderation within Armed Secessionist Movements. *Political Geography* 64 (May), 23-32.
- Sindre GM and Söderström J** (2016) Understanding Armed Groups and Party Politics. *Civil Wars*, 18 (2), 109-117
- Sobek D and Payne C** (2010) A Tale of Two Types: Rebel Goals and the Onset of Civil Wars. *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1), 213-240.
- Straus S** (2015) *Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Sukyens B** (2015) Comparing Rebel Rule through Revolutions and Naturalizations: Ideologies of Governance in Naxalie and Naga India, Ch 7 in Arjona, A., Mampilly Z, and Kasfir N (eds.), *Rebel Governance in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 138-57.

- Thaler KM** (2012) Ideology and Violence in Civil Wars: Theory and Evidence from Mozambique and Angola. *Civil Wars* 14(4), 546-567.
- Tezcür GM** (2010) The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors. *Party Politics* 16(1), 69-88.
- Tilly C** (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. New York: Random House.
- Ufen A** (2008) Political Party and Party System Institutionalization in Southeast Asia: Lessons for Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. *The Pacific Review* 21(3), 327-350.
- Ufen A** (2009) Political Parties and Democratization in Indonesia. In Bünte M and Ufen A (eds.), *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, Abingdon: Routledge: 153-175.
- Ugarriza J and Craig MJ** (2013) The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary Armed Conflicts: A Quantitative Analysis of Former Combatants in Colombia. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(3), 445-477
- Weinstein JM** (2007) *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Whiting M** (2018) Moderation without Change: The Strategic Transformation of Sinn Féin and the IRA in Northern Ireland *Government and Opposition* 53(2): 288-311.
- Wickham CR** (2004) The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party *Comparative Politics* 36(2):205-228.
- Wilson A** (2016) *Sovereignty in Exile: A Saharan Liberation Movement Governs*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Wimmer A** (2013) *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wood EJ** (2008) The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks. *The Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 539-561.
- Young C** (1982) *Ideology and Development in Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press.